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Unifying physics by describing a variety of interactions – or even all in-
teractions – within a common framework has long been an alluring goal for
physicists. One of the most ambitious attempts at unification was made in
the 1910s by Gustav Mie. Mie aimed to derive electromagnetism, gravita-
tion, and aspects of the emerging quantum theory from a single variational
principle and a well-chosen Lagrangian. Mie’s main innovation was to con-
sider nonlinear field equations to allow for stable particle-like solutions (now
called solitons), and he clarified the use of variational principles in the con-
text of special relativity. The following brief introduction to Mie’s work has
three main objectives.1 The first is to explain how Mie’s project fit into
the contemporary development of the electromagnetic world view. Part of
Mie’s project was to develop a relativistic theory of gravitation as a conse-
quence of his generalized electromagnetic theory, and our second goal is to
briefly assess this work, which reflects the conceptual resources available for
developing a new account of gravitation by analogy with electromagnetism.
Finally, Mie was a vocal critic of other approaches to the problem of gravi-
tation. Mie’s criticisms of Einstein, in particular, bring out the subtelty and
novelty of the ideas that Einstein used to guide his development of general
relativity.
In September of 1913 Einstein presented a lecture on the current sta-
tus of the problem of gravitation at the 85th Naturforscherversammlung.
Einstein’s lecture and the ensuing heated discussion, both published later
that year in the Physikalische Zeitschrift, reflect the options available for
those who took on the task of developing a new theory of gravitation. The
1Our study of Mie has been aided considerably by several recent discussions of his work,
including Kohl (2002), Corry (1999), and Vizgin (1994, 26-38). Born (1914), included in
this volume, gives an insightful, influential reformulation of Mie’s framework, and Pauli
(1921, §64, 188-192 in the English translation) and Weyl (1918, §25, 206-217 (§26) in the
English translation of the fourth edition) both give clear contemporary reviews.
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conflict between Newtonian gravitational theory and special relativity pro-
vided a strong motivation for developing a new gravitational theory, but
it was not clear whether a fairly straightforward modification of Newton’s
theory based on classical field theory would lead to a successful replace-
ment. Einstein clearly aimed to convince his audience that success would
require the more radical step of extending the principle of relativity. For
Einstein the development of a new gravitational theory was intricately con-
nected with foundational problems in classical mechanics, and in the Vienna
lecture he motivated the need to extend the principle of relativity with an
appeal to Mach’s analysis of inertia. According to Einstein Mach had accu-
rately identified an “epistemological defect” in classical mechanics, namely
the introduction of a distinction between inertial and non-inertial reference
frames without an appropriate observational basis.2 The special theory of
relativity had replaced Galilean transformations between reference frames
with Lorentz transformations, but the principle of relativity still did not
apply to accelerated motion. Extending the principle of relativity to ac-
celerated motion depended on an idea Einstein later called “the best idea
of my life,” the principle of equivalence. This idea received many different
formulations over the years, but in 1913 Einstein gave one version of this
principle as a postulate: his second postulate requires the exact equality of
inertial and gravitational mass. He further argued that this equality under-
mines the ability to observationally distinguish between a state of uniform
acceleration and the presence of a gravitational field. The principle of equiv-
alence gave Einstein a valuable link between acceleration and gravitation,
tying together the problem of gravitation and the problem of extending the
principle of relativity. At the time of the Vienna lecture Einstein was in
the midst of an ongoing struggle to clarify the connections among Mach’s
insight, a generalized principle of relavity, and the formal requirement of
general covariance, a struggle that would continue for several more years.
Although he also drew heavily on classical field theory in his work, he was
convinced that this cluster of ideas would provide the key to a new theory
of gravitation.
Gustav Mie’s approach to the problem of gravitation stands in sharp con-
trast to Einstein’s. In the discussion following the Vienna lecture, Mie point-
edly criticized Einstein’s requirement of general covariance and complained
that Einstein had overlooked other approaches to gravitation, including his
2Einstein discusses these issues in §4 and §9 of the Vienna lecture, as well as in part II
of Einstein (1914), both included in this volume. For a thorough discussion of the role of
Machian ideas in Einstein’s discovery of general relativity, see Renn (this volume).
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own work and that of Max Abraham.3 Mie commented that Einstein might
have missed his theory of gravitation since it was “tucked away in a work on
a comprehensive theory of matter” (CPAE 5, Doc. 18, 1262). This remark
aptly characterizes where Mie placed the problem of gravitation conceptu-
ally; in Mie’s approach the problem of gravitation would be solved as a
byproduct of an extension of classical field theory. The problem of gravita-
tion was one of the issues, among many, that a “comprehensive theory of
matter” would resolve. The pressing issue for Mie was to develop a unified
field theory that would succeed where earlier attempts at a reduction of
mechanics to electromagnetic theory had failed. By way of contrast with
Einstein, Mie’s project did not lead out of special relativity, and Mie was
not convinced by Einstein’s attempt to link issues in the foundations of
mechanics to the problem of gravitation. In Vienna, Einstein justified his
sin of omission by pointing out that Mie’s theory violated one of his start-
ing assumptions, namely the principle of equivalence. But this clearly did
not sway Mie, who expressed doubts that the principle could serve as the
basis for a theory and whether it even held in Einstein’s own “Entwurf”
theory.4 Mie was also a forceful critic of Einstein’s search for a generalized
principle of relativity. In the discussion following the Vienna talk and in
subsequent articles (Mie 1914 and 1915, included in this volume), Mie ar-
gued that Einstein had failed to establish a clear link between a principle of
general relativity and accelerated motion and questioned the physical con-
tent of the principle. Mie had put his finger on the ambiguity of Einstein’s
guiding principles and the slippage between these ideas and the formal re-
quirement of general covariance. More generally, Mie’s criticisms illustrate
that Einstein’s idiosyncratic path to developing a new gravitational theory
seemed to lead into the wilderness in 1913, and Einstein had not provided
entirely convincing reasons to abandon a more conservative path toward a
new theory.
Mie’s comprehensive theory of matter was presented in a series of three
ambitious papers in 1912-13. Mie was eleven years older than Einstein and
had held a position as a theoretical physicist in Griefswald since 1902. He
was well known for work in applied optics and electromagnetism, includ-
ing an insightful treatment of the scattering of electromagnetic radiation by
3In the published version of the lecture Einstein does briefly mention Abraham’s theory
only to remark that it fails to satisfy his third postulate, namely the requirement of Lorentz
covariance. Mie later noted (Mie 1914, note 13 on 175) that the reference to Abraham
was only added in the published version of the lecture.
4In the discussion, Mie announced that he would soon publish a proof that equality
does not hold in the “Entwurf” theory, which appeared in §3 of Mie (1914).
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spherical particles (Mie 1908) and a widely used textbook (Mie 1910). Mie’s
textbook endorsed the electromagnetic worldview prominently advocated in
the previous decade by Wilhelm Wien and Max Abraham. This worldview
amounted to the claim that electromagnetic theory had replaced mechanics
as the foundation of physical theory, and Mie characterized electromagnetic
theory as “aether physics.” Mie emphasized the appeal of reducing physics
to a simple set of equations governing the state of the aether and its dynam-
ical evolution, and conceiving of elementary particles as stable “knots” in
the aether rather than independent entities (Mie 1912a, 512-13). The aim of
the trilogy on matter theory was to develop a unified theory able to account
for the existence and properties of electrons (as well as atoms or molecules),
explain recent observations of atomic spectra, and yield field equations for
gravitation. Although Mie ultimately failed to achieve these grand goals,
the approach and formalism he developed influenced later work in unified
field theory.
Mie’s program differed in important ways from electron theories from
the previous decade.5 The main obstacle to earlier attempts to realize the
electromagnetic world view was the difficulty of explaining the nature and
structure of the electron itself in purely electromagnetic terms. Electron
theory was an active research area in the first decade of the 20th century,
drawing the attention of many of the best physicists of that generation,
such as Lorentz, Abraham, and Sommerfeld. By the time of Mie’s work
the aim of determining the internal structure of the electron, treated as an
extended particle with a definite shape and charge distribution, had been
largely abandoned and interest in electron theory had begun to wane. With
the advent of special relativity came the realization that the velocity depen-
dence of the electron’s mass, a quantity that had been touted as a sensitive
experimental test of the internal structure of the electron, was instead a di-
rect consequence of the principle of relativity (Pauli 1921, 185; Pais 1972).6
Developments in electron theory also threatened the goal of replacing New-
tonian mechanics with electromagnetism. Poincare´ (1906) proved that an
electron treated as a distribution of charge over a spherical shell is not a
stable configuration if only the electromagnetic forces are included – the re-
5Here we draw primarily on Janssen and Mecklenburg (2005)’s insightful analysis of the
transition from electron theory to relativistic electodynamics; see also the essays collected
in Buchwald and Warwick (2001).
6Lorentz put the point as follows in 1922, “the formula for momentum is a general
consequence of the principle of relativity, and a verification of that formula is a verification
of the principle and tells us nothing about the nature of mass or of the structure of the
electron,” quoted in Janssen and Mecklenburg (2005).
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pulsive Coulomb forces would cause it to break apart. Thus it was necessary
to introduce the so-called “Poincare´ stress,” an attractive force needed to
maintain the stability of the electron.
One way of responding to these results was to temper the reductive am-
bitions of the electromagnetic world view, and to follow Lorentz in admitting
charged particles or non-electromagnetic forces as basic elements of the the-
ory. Mie took a different route, and chose instead to alter the field equations
of electromagnetism so that there are solutions corresponding to stable par-
ticles. A successful theory along these lines would describe the fundamental
particles as stable solutions to a set of field equations (with laws of motion
derived directly from the field equations) without introducing particles as
independent entities, and in this sense reduce mechanics to (generalized)
electrodynamics. In effect, Mie treated Maxwell’s equations as a weak-field
limit of more general field equations. In order to allow for stable charge
configurations such as an electron Mie considered non-linear field equations.
The fundamental desideratum for the theory was to find generalized field
equations that admitted stable solutions representing elementary particles
and also reduced to Maxwell’s equations in an appropriate limit for regions
far from the particles.7 Mie further aimed to show that gravitation would
naturally emerge as a consequence of the generalized field equations.
The key to Mie’s theory was the “world function” (Hamiltonian), which
he used to derive the field equations via Hamilton’s principle. Maxwell’s
field equations in empty space follow from a Lagrangian ΦEM = −14FµνFµν ,
where Fµν is the Maxwell tensor and the repeated indices (with µ, ν = 1...4)
are summed over. Mie’s program was to find the terms added to ΦEM that
would yield the desired generalized field equations. Mie introduced two fun-
damental assumptions regarding Φ at the outset of the Grundlagen. First,
electrons and other charged particles should be regarded as “states of the
aether” rather than independent entities. Mie insisted that the states of the
aether should suffice for a complete physical description of matter, although
he admitted that failure of his program might force one to enlarge the al-
lowed fundamental variables. To enforce the first assumption Mie required
that the world function depends only on the field variables (including the
electric charge density, the convection current, the magnetic field strength,
7Mie was not the first to consider this way of extending classical electromagnetism.
Prior to Mie’s work Einstein considered replacing Maxwell’s field equations with non-
linear, inhomogeneous, and/or higher order equations, as reflected in correspondence with
Lorentz and Besso in 1908-1910 (see McCormach (1970) and Vizgin (1994), 19-26). Ein-
stein, however, was much more keenly aware than Mie of the deep challenges posed by the
quantum structure of radiation.
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and the electric displacement). As Born emphasized (1914, 32), this ruled
out treating charged particles with trajectories given by independent equa-
tions of motion as the source of the field, since including a coupling to
a background current in the Lagrangian (i.e., adding a term proportional
to Jµφµ) would explicitly introduce dependence on spacetime coordinates.
The second assumption was the validity of special relativity, with the con-
sequence that Φ must be Lorentz covariant. The world function could only
include functions of Lorentz invariant terms constructed from Fµν and φµ,
the four-vector potential.8 Mie argued that functions of only two of these
invariants, namely FµνFµν and φνφν should appear in Φ. For the general
field equations to reduce to Maxwell’s equations, the φνφν term could have
non-zero values only in regions occupied by particles.
Mie failed to flesh out his formalism with a specific world function sat-
ifying these constraints that led to a reasonable physical theory. Instead
he was limited to illustrating his approach with simple examples, such as a
Lagrangian Φ = −14FµνFµν + α(φνφν)3, where α is an arbitrary constant.
Solutions to the field equations that follow from this Lagrangian could be
taken to represent elementary particles, and Mie calculated the charge and
mass of the particles. However, these solutions had a number of undesirable
features. The arbitrary coefficient appearing in the Lagrangian implied that
these solutions placed no constraints on the charge and mass of the “par-
ticles,” rather than leading to the distinctive values of charge and mass for
known particles such as the electron. Mie was further forced to admit (1912b,
38) that his simple world function did not lead to reasonable solutions for
interacting charged particles; instead the solutions described a world that
eventually separated into two lumps of opposite charge moving away from
each other. The simple world functions considered by Mie were not viable
candidates for a comprehensive description of matter, but he clearly hoped
that these problems could be blamed on his lack of ingenuity rather than
on his formal framework. However, Pauli (1921, 192) highlighted a problem
that went deeper than the failure to find a suitable world-function. Mie’s
world function and the resulting equations of motion both include functions
8Since Fµν =
∂φν
∂xµ
− ∂φµ
∂xν
, the Lagrangian depends on φν and its first derivatives. The
list of invariants included the following quantities:
1
2
FµνF
µν ; φνφ
ν ; Fµνφ
νFµρφρ; (Fµνφρ + Fνρφµ + Fρµφν)
2 (1)
One invariant was missing from Mie’s original list, as Pauli (1921) noted: the quantity
1
4
F ∗µνF
µν , where F ∗µν is the dual of Fµν , is an invariant of the restricted Lorentz group,
and its square is an invariant of the full Lorentz group.
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of φν . As a result, a stable solution with some value of φ is in general not
also a solution for φ+constant, and the world function also fails to be gauge
invariant.9
Mie hoped that the appropriate world function (supposing one could be
found) would incorporate gravity without needing to put it in by hand. At
the outset of the Grundlagen Mie announced his goal of deriving gravity
from his matter theory without introducing new dynamical variables and
sketched a fanciful picture according to which gravity was a consequence
of a cohesive shell or atmosphere binding particles together within an atom
(Mie 1912a, 512-514). Mie’s description of his project may have raised hopes
that the third paper would introduce a truly novel approach to gravitation
based on non-linear electrodynamics. But like his other grand goals, this
one also eluded Mie’s grasp.
Mie’s gravitational theory has a great deal in common with competing
theories due to Abraham and Nordstro¨m. Like Nordstro¨m, Mie retained
an invariant speed of light and upheld the strict validity of the principle of
relativity. This sets his approach apart from Abraham’s work; Abraham
renounced the constancy of the speed of light and retained the validity of
the principle of relativity, restricted to infinitesimal space-time regions, in
his first theory, and renounced the principle of relativity all together in his
second theory.10 But like Abraham and Nordstro¨m, Mie treated both the
source of the gravitational field and the gravitational potential to be four-
dimensional (Lorentz) scalars, and these were introduced as independent
quantities in the world function with no connection to the electromagnetic
field. The source of the gravitational field, h, the density of gravitational-
mass in Mie’s theory, is identical to the Hamiltonian density. It is then a
short step to derive field equations for the gravitational field appealing to
Hamilton’s principle. As Mie emphasized, the resulting field equations would
be identical to those given by Abraham (1912) except for the introduction of
another variable in the world function.11 By analogy with his matter theory,
Mie introduced an extensive quantity (the excitation of the gravitational
field, analogous to electric displacement) conjugate to the gravitational field
9Mie recognized this problem and argued that the resulting dependence on the absolute
value of the potential would not lead to conflicts with experimental results (Mie 1912b,
24; Mie 1913, 62). Born and Infeld (1934) revived Mie’s idea of using a more general
Lagrangian, but they excluded additional terms that depended on φν to preserve gauge
invariance.
10See Renn (this volume) and Norton (this volume) for discussions of Abraham’s and
Nordstro¨m’s theories, respectively.
11See Mie (1913, 28-29) and the discussion following the Vienna lecture (CPAE 5, Doc.
18).
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strength, and argued that the two are identical in an “ideal vacuum” but
have an unspecified functional relation in regions occupied by matter.
Mie’s failure to achieve a substantial unification illustrates the obsta-
cles to treating gravitation by analogy with electromagnetism. Mie (1915)
clearly explained the necessity of introducing the gravitational potential as
a dynamical variable in order to resolve the negative energy problem, the
most important disanalogy. This problem arises if energy is attributed to
the gravitational field itself (as with the electromagnetic field), since the
gravitational field strength of, for example, two gravitating masses increases
as two masses approach each other, releasing energy in the form of work ex-
tracted from the system. One way to save energy conservation in light of this
feature of gravitation was to attribute negative energy to the gravitational
field, as is suggested by treating Newtonian gravitation in close formal anal-
ogy to electrostatics. However, a field with negative energy cannot maintain
a stable equilibrium since any small perturbation of the field would in gen-
eral grow without limit. Following Abraham, Mie argued that the way out
of this dilemma was instead to include the gravitational potential in the
world-function. With this, the internal energy of two approaching masses
can be shown to decrease with the decrease of the gravitational potential,
thereby compensating for the increase in the field energy.
Including the gravitational potential as a dynamical variable has the con-
sequence that, unlike in electromagnetism, the equations governing physical
phenomena depend upon the absolute value of the potential rather than
on just potential differences. However, no such dependence had been em-
pirically detected. It remains, moreover, to specify exactly how the field
energy depends on the gravitational potential. As Mie (1915) noted, differ-
ent choices for this dependence correspond to different gravitational theories.
Given the lack of empirical guidance to settle the issue, Mie argued in favor
of introducing a principle that would dictate this dependence rather than
making what he regarded as arbitrary assumptions. Mie hoped to reconcile
his theory’s explicit dependence on the absolute value of the gravitational
potential with the failure to experimentally detect any such dependence via
the theorem (later called a principle) of the relativity of the gravitational
potential (discussed below). The principle plays a central role in the de-
velopment of Mie’s theory, and in elucidating this idea Mie drew a sharp
contrast between his approach and Einstein’s insistence on generalizing the
principle of relativity.
Mie (1915) formulated the principle of the relativity of the gravitational
potential as follows:
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In two regions of different gravitational potential exactly the
same processes can run according to exactly the same laws if
one only thinks of the units of measurement as changing in a
suitable way with the value of the gravitational potential. (Mie
1915, 257)
In order to understand the content of this principle, it is perhaps helpful to
consider that the principle is equivalent to the requirement that the world
function Φ be a homogenous function of the dynamical variables, including
the gravitational potential (Mie (1915, 258)). From this it immediately fol-
lows that in regions of constant gravitational potential, one can transform
the potential away, or into any other constant potential, through a rescal-
ing of the remaining dynamical variables and, in general, the space time
coordinates. Thus, for an observer using correspondingly rescaled measur-
ing units to measure the dynamical variables, the gravitational potential
will be undetectable. Thinking of Mie’s principle of relativity of the grav-
itational potential along these lines as an invariance of the theory under
rescaling, we see the gravitational potential and rescalings in Mie’s theory
as anologous, respectively, to the the metric tensor and general linear trans-
formations in Einstein’s tensor theory.12 Simply put, Mie introduces the
gravitational potential into the world function to solve the negative energy
problem, and introduces an invariance principle, the principle of the rela-
tivity of the gravitational potential, to remove any dependence of physical
laws on the potential.
By contrast with Einstein, Mie’s introduction of this invariance principle
for the gravitational field had no connection with foundational problems in
mechanics or with extending the principle of relativity. Mie was clearly quite
skeptical of the heuristic value of Einstein’s guiding ideas. In the discussion
following the Vienna lecture, Mie pointedly criticized the idea of extending
the principle of relativity to arbitrary states of motion. Mie pressed Einstein
to clarify what would be gained by treating a complicated non-uniform mo-
tion, such as a bumpy train ride, as physically equivalent to the gravitational
field produced by some array of fictitious planets (CPAE 5, Doc. 18). The
underlying problem stemmed from Einstein’s failure to distinguish between
two claims. In the familiar cases of relativity of uniform motion, the two
systems in relative motion are entirely physically equivalent. But Einstein’s
12Our understanding here was guided by CPAE 8, Doc. 346, fn. 3. Note that in
his earlier work, Mie (1912, 61) refers to this as the theorem of the relativity of the
gravitational potential. Even at this early juncture, though, Mie is quick to elevate this
theorem, immediately dubbing it a principle.
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extension of relativity to non-uniform motion involves a very different claim;
as he would later clarify, what is relative in the case of non-uniform motion
is how the metric field is split into inertial and gravitational components.
This does not, however, imply that two observers in non-uniform motion
with respect to each other are physically equivalent. In 1913 Einstein did
not answer Mie by drawing this distinction; instead, he replied that his
theory did not satisfy an entirely general principle of relativity due to a re-
striction on allowed coordinate transformations (needed, Einstein thought,
to insure energy-momentum conservation). Mie (1914) further argued that
since the “Entwurf” theory admits only general linear transformations, it
does not realize a general principle of relativity, but in fact satisfies precisely
Mie’s principle of the relativity of the gravitational potential.
Einstein’s equivalence principle was also a target of Mie’s criticisms.
This is not surprising, since Mie’s commitment to retaining the framework
of special relativity implied that in his theory inertial and gravitational mass
would not be exactly equal. Mie (1915, §§5 & 6) calculated the effect of the
thermal motions of the constituents of bodies on this ratio, and argued that
departures from 1 would be well within experimental bounds. Exact equiv-
alence could be had at the price of various auxiliary assumptions, according
to Mie, but he did not see the need for such extra assumptions, given that
his theory fit experimental constraints. He further claimed that Einstein’s
theory can only guarantee exact equivalence by making inconsistent assump-
tions (Mie 1914, 176). This attitude toward the equivalence principle marks
another contrast with Einstein, who took the “unity of essence” of inertia
and gravitation to be one of the central foundational insights to be respected
by his new theory.
In summary, Mie’s work illustrates the potential and limitations of ap-
proaching the problem of gravitation within the framework of relativistic
field theory. Mie’s main innovation in the Grundlagen was to consider non-
linear field equations, which opened up the possibility of reducing physics
to an electromagnetic matter theory. The appeal of this idea has to be
balanced against the theory’s glaring deficiency, namely the failure to find
a particular world function describing even a simple physical system such
as two interacting particles. To paraphrase Einstein, although Mie’s the-
ory provided a fine formal framework, it was not clear how to fill it with
physical content.13 Even those sympathetic to Mie’s program had to ad-
13In a 1922 letter to Weyl regarding Eddington’s later attempt at a unified field theory,
quoted in Vizgin (1994, 37), Einstein commented that “I find the Eddington argument to
have this in common with Mie’s theory: it is a fine frame, but one cannot see how it can
be filled”; see also his negative assessments of Mie’s theory (directly or as it was used by
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mit doubts that this innovation would lead to a successful matter theory,
especially given the recent discoveries of quantum phenomena. But what-
ever the prospects for matter theory based on generalized electrodynamics,
Mie’s innovations in the Grundlagen turned out to provide few insights for
developing a gravitational theory. His own gravitational theory shared the
insights and limitations of other Lorentz-covariant theories of gravitation.
In terms of the further development of gravitational theories, Mie’s indirect
influence on David Hilbert is more significant than his own theory. This
influence was mediated by Born (1914)’s clear reformulation of Mie’s the-
ory, which showed how Mie’s theory fit into the more general framework
of (four-dimensional) continuum mechanics as a special case. Mie’s project
of unification and his mathematical framework, as refined by Born, shaped
Hilbert’s distinctive path to a new gravitational theory, as Renn and Stachel
(this volume) explore in great detail.14 However, Hilbert differed from Mie
sharply with regard to the status of special relativity. Mie was a persistent
critic of Einstein’s move to a metric theory of gravitation and saw no reason
to leave the framework of special relativity. Hilbert, on the other hand, took
Einstein’s “Entwurf” theory as one of his starting points, and his synthesis of
Mie’s matter theory with Einstein’s gravitational theory involved replacing
the fixed Minkowski metric of special relativity with Einstein’s metric ten-
sor. The fertility of Mie’s matter theory for Hilbert depended upon setting
aside Mie’s criticisms of Einstein’s move away from special relativity.
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